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CONTEXTUALIZING DISCLOSURE’S EFFECTS: WIKILEAKS, BALANCING AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
Forthcoming Iowa Law Review Bulletin (2012) 
 
CHRISTINA E. WELLS
*
 
 
Introduction 
Professor Fenster’s article discussing the effects of the WikiLeaks disclosures is a 
welcome addition to the all-too-often visceral literature describing Wikileaks and Julian 
Assange.
1
 As Professor Fenster notes, with the passage of time since the WikiLeaks disclosures, 
we can assess more calmly than at the time of the original disclosure whether the promise and 
peril of the published material has come to pass. Such information may even cast light on the 
interest balancing courts use to determine whether disclosure of classified or sensitive 
information violates federal law. Indeed, Professor Fenster concludes that the inability to predict 
the effects of disclosure demonstrates that “a core theoretical concept and assumption for the 
laws governing access to government information are incoherent and conceptually bankrupt.”2 
I agree with Professor Fenster that the current balancing approach is problematic. But I 
am less sanguine about whether others will reach the same conclusion. Recent news reports 
suggest that the United States government has filed a secret indictment against Julian Assange, 
presumably for violating the Espionage Act with the 2010 and 2011 WikiLeaks disclosures.
3
 If 
                                                 
*
 Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. Special thanks to Scott Snipkie who 
provided valuable research for this response essay. 
1
 Much of the literature describing Assange likens him either to a hero or a terrorist and describes the effects of his 
actions in grand or awful terms depending on the speakers’ viewpoints. Compare Anna Mulrine, Pentagon Papers 
vs. WikiLeaks: Is Bradley Manning the New Ellsberg?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 13, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/0613/Pentagon-Papers-vs.-WikiLeaks-Is-Bradley-Manning-the-new-
Ellsberg (quoting Daniel Ellsberg as calling Assange a “hero”), with Ewen MacAskill, Julian Assange like a High-
Tech Terrorist, Says Joe Biden, GUARDIAN (London) (Dec. 19, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/19/assange-high-tech-terrorist-biden; Fox News’ Bob Beckel Calls for 
‘Illegally’ Killing Assange: ‘A Dead Man Can’t Leak Stuff’ (VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2010, 5:46 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/fox-news-bob-beckel-calls_n_793467.html. 
2
 Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753, 806 (2012). 
3
 Jennifer Robinson, Opinion, Time for Government To Stand Ground and Protect Assange, SYDNEY MORNING 
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the government pursues this prosecution, the phenomena Professor Fenster identifies will likely 
work against Assange and WikiLeaks rather than against the current balancing approach, an 
approach which is highly manipulable and allows the government great latitude in the face of 
uncertain consequences. This brief response to Professor Fenster’s article builds upon his 
observations about the WikiLeaks disclosures to explore the significant problems with the 
court’s balancing approach and its implications for Assange and others who may publish 
confidential government information. 
I. The Evolution of Balancing As Applied to Disclosure of Information Under the 
Espionage Act 
A prosecution of Assange is likely to proceed under a provision of the Espionage Act,
4
 
which punishes anyone who has “unauthorized possession of . . . information relating to the 
national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation” and who “willfully 
communicates, delivers, [or] transmits . . . the same to any person not entitled to receive it.”5 
Prosecutors might also pursue Assange for conspiring with Bradley Manning, the government 
employee who allegedly accessed the confidential information, to violate 18 U.S.C. § 793(e). As 
                                                                                                                                                             
HERALD (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/time-for-government-to-stand-ground-and-protect-
assange-20120229-1u3cn.html. As Professor Fenster observes, the government contemplated bringing such an 
indictment soon after the Wikileaks’ disclosures. See Fenster, supra note 2, at 765. 
4
 Other statutes may also apply. See Fenster, supra note 2, at 787 n.161. I focus on the Espionage Act charges 
because of the potential breadth of the criminal liability, the similarity in balancing to other confidential information 
disclosure approaches Professor Fenster identifies, and because Professor Fenster singles this statute out as his 
primary focus. 
The other possible charges against Assange could include a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006), which 
criminalizes knowing theft of government property (including information), or conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a) (2006), which incorporates portions of the Espionage Act into statutes prohibiting access to government 
computers. Bradley Manning, the government employee accused of providing the classified information to Assange 
and WikiLeaks, has been charged with violating these statutes. 
5
 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2006). I leave to others the difficult discussion of whether the government can successfully 
overcome technical obstacles to such prosecutions. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Wikileaks and the Institutional 
Framework for National Security Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1479–83 (2012). This response assumes that the 
government will successfully overcome such obstacles. 
 Professor Fenster notes, although this law “appears to sweep broadly to impose criminal 
sanctions on disclosure” of confidential government information, the First Amendment 
protections of free speech and press somewhat limits its application.
6
 
A. The Pentagon Papers Decision 
The most recognized Supreme Court case on this topic involves the New York Times and 
Washington Post’s decisions to publish excerpts of a top-secret study about the Vietnam War 
(the “Pentagon Papers”) while the war was ongoing. In New York Times Co. v. United States,7 a 
majority of the Court refused to sustain injunctions barring further publications of the Pentagon 
Papers, primarily because such injunctions were unreasonable prior restraints against the press.
8
 
The Court’s per curiam opinion did not establish a standard for injunctions against disclosure, 
but the concurring opinions noted that the government’s burden was very high. Thus, Justices 
Black and Douglas argued against the injunctions altogether because of the Court’s general 
antipathy to prior restraints.
9
 Justice Brennan, on the other hand, posited that “only governmental 
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the 
occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support 
even the issuance of an [injunction].”10 Justice Stewart also noted that an injunction was 
inappropriate because the disclosed documents would not “surely result in direct, immediate, and 
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.”11 
Although the possibility of enjoining the press clearly troubled the Justices, they were not 
                                                 
6
 Fenster, supra note 2, at 787. 
7
 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
8
 Id. at 714 (“‘Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against 
its constitutional validity.’” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
9
 Id. at 714–20 (Black, J., concurring). 
10
 Id. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
11
 Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 as opposed to potential criminal punishment under the Espionage Act. Justices White and 
Stewart, concurring in the result, noted the availability of “specific and appropriate criminal laws 
. . .  [that] are of very colorable relevance to the apparent circumstances of these cases.”12 
Several other Justices similarly intimated that the Espionage Act allowed criminal punishment of 
the newspapers’ publication of the Pentagon Papers.13 Unfortunately, these opinions did not 
discuss the standard under which such criminal sanctions should be judged. Thus, the Court’s 
intimation that criminal punishment might survive constitutional scrutiny, without more, served 
merely to muddy the constitutional waters.  Given that the government did not pursue sanctions 
against the newspapers in New York Times, other courts were left to determine when and how to 
balance the Espionage Act’s arguable punishment of disclosure against the First Amendment’s 
right to free expression. 
B. Subsequent Lower Court Decisions 
Relatively few of these later decisions involved attempts to punish nongovernment 
publishers of classified or sensitive information. Rather, they have typically involved application 
of the Espionage Act to persons who engaged in classic espionage activities.
14
 Two exceptions 
exist. The first decision, United States v. Morison, involved prosecution of a government 
employee who leaked top-secret photographs of a Soviet aircraft carrier to Jane’s Defence 
Weekly.
15
 Although there was no espionage-related activity, the court found that the defendant’s 
                                                 
12
 Id.; see also id. at 737 (White, J., concurring) (“I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions under these 
sections on facts that would not justify the . . . imposition of a prior restraint.”). 
13
 Id. at 743 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 753–54 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
14
 See Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 882 & n.5.  Such 
activities involve, for example, an individual delivering national defense information to a foreign government in 
exchange for financial incentives. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 635 nn.48–49 (E.D. Va. 2006) 
(gathering cases documenting persons subject to prosecution under § 793(d) and § 793(e)). 
15
 See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060–62 (4th Cir. 1988). There have been recent prosecutions of 
government employees who leaked secret information to the press. For example, the Bush Administration’s National 
Security Administration surveillance scheme and the United States’ efforts to impede other governments’ weapons 
 actions fell within section 793(e)’s proscription of providing national-defense information to 
persons not entitled to receive it.
16
 However, even here the extension of section 793(e) is 
somewhat understandable. The free-speech rights of government employees are limited 
compared to the rights of citizens, and certainly more so when employees undertake a position of 
confidence and trust, such as when their job gives them access to confidential information.
17
 
The other decision, United States v. Rosen,
18
 is far more worrisome since it is the only 
decision to date to find that section 793(e) reaches nonespionage-related disclosures by 
nongovernment actors. Rosen involved two political lobbyists (Rosen and Weissman) for the 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”), an organization that lobbied Congress 
and the executive branch on behalf of Israel.
19
 The government accused Rosen and Weissman, in 
their positions as lobbyists, of conspiring to violate the Espionage Act by cultivating 
relationships with federal officials, gaining access to sensitive information, and disseminating 
that information to others not entitled to receive it, such as the media, foreign policy analysts, 
and officials of other governments.
20
   
In response to defendants’ First Amendment challenge, the court framed its task as a 
balancing inquiry. Thus, whether Congress could penalize Rosen and Weissman involved the 
                                                                                                                                                             
development; however, neither resulted in a written opinion assessing the First Amendment issues. See Sandra 
Davidson, Leaks, Leakers, and Journalists: Adding Historical Context to the Age of WikiLeaks, 34 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 27, 69–70 (2011). 
16
 Morison, 844 F.2d at 1068–70. 
17
 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, TOP SECRET 6–11 (2007). As Professor Stone points out, even government 
employees may (or should) be protected when revealing confidential information in some instances.  Id. at 13–14; 
see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1531, 1533–35 (2008) (discussing the unfortunate lack of whistleblower protection in national-security 
context). But public employees who disclose information unquestionably have fewer rights under existing doctrine 
than a member of the general public. 
18
 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006). Commentators noted that Rosen was “the first 
reported prosecution by the U.S. government against private citizens for exchanging classified information in the 
course of concededly nonespionage activities.” Kitrosser, supra note 14, at 882. 
19
 See Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 607–08. 
20
 Id. at 608. 
 “‘delicate and difficult task’ of weighing [the competing societal interests at stake] ‘to determine 
whether the resulting restriction on freedom can be tolerated.’”21 According to the court, the 
lobbyists’ interest “implicate[d] the core values” of the First Amendment since gathering 
information about the government and discussing it with others “is indispensable to the healthy 
functioning of a representative government.”22 This was just as true for information the 
government preferred to keep secret because even democratic governments tend “to withhold 
reports of disquieting developments and to manage news in a fashion most favorable to itself.”23 
However, defendants had not simply disclosed secrets; rather, they had disclosed “government 
secrets . . .  which could threaten the security of the nation.”24 “[T]he right to free speech,” the 
court concluded, “must yield to the government’s legitimate efforts to ensure ‘the environment of 
physical security which a functioning democracy requires.’”25 In light of these principles, the 
judge construed section 793(e) as punishing only intentional disclosure of “closely held” 
information that a defendant knows is “‘potentially damaging to the United States or . . . useful 
to an enemy of the United States.’”26 Using this interpretation, the court concluded that the law 
applied to defendants and that Congress had drawn the appropriate balance in the Espionage Act 
between national security and free-speech interests.
27
 
In a series of subsequent motions, the court allowed defendants to show that they lacked 
                                                 
21
 Id. at 633 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967)). 
22
 Id. 
23
 Id. (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1081 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)). 
24
 Id. (emphasis added). 
25
 Id. at 634 (quoting Morison, 844 F.2d  at 1082) (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
26
 Id. at 639 (quoting Morison, 844 F.2d at 1084) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)). The court made clear that “closely 
held” was not synonymous with classified information. The government might treat information as “classified” 
while nevertheless not securing it in a manner qualifying it as “closely held”—e.g., by leaking it on purpose. Courts 
or juries determine if information is closely held. See id. at 620–21, 639–40. 
27
 Id..at 638–39. 
 the state of mind required by the statute by subpoenaing several top government officials.
28
 
Defendants argued that they did not know their disclosures could potentially damage the United 
States or aid its enemies because government officials regularly leaked information to them as a 
form of “back channel” diplomacy.29 In 2009, prosecutors dismissed the case against 
defendants,
30
 complaining that the court’s “knowledge” requirement established an impossibly 
“high” evidentiary burden.”31 Yet it is not at all clear that Rosen’s test is a hurdle to prosecutors 
pursuing individuals in circumstances different from Rosen and Weissman (i.e., non-lobbyists) 
who disclose confidential information.  
II. Balancing the Effects of the WikiLeaks’ Disclosures 
Despite prosecutors’ complaints about its high evidentiary burden, Rosen’s balancing test 
is actually quite malleable and can result in substantial deference to government officials’ claims 
of threats to national security. In fact, Rosen’s approach hearkens back to earlier, discredited 
Supreme Court decisions. Experience with those decisions suggests that indeterminate balancing 
tests like that in Rosen are likely to be used most effectively against certain kinds of speakers 
that the government can cast as radical outsiders, like Assange, regardless of whether they pose 
an actual threat to national security. 
A. Balancing Tests and National Security in the Twentieth Century 
Beginning in World War I, the Supreme Court struggled to find the appropriate test to 
determine when speech was sufficiently dangerous to be punished. In Schenck v. United States, 
                                                 
28
 United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Va. 2007) (allowing subpoenas of Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice and former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, among others). 
29
 Id. at 808. 
30
 See Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment, United States v. Rosen, Crim. No. 1:05CR225 (E.D. Va. May 1, 
2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/aipac/dismiss.pdf.  
31
 See Eli Lake, Case Against AIPAC Lobbyists Dropped, WASH. TIMES, May 2, 2009, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/02/fed-drop-charges-against-aipac-staffers/ (discussing the 
prosecution’s allegations of an “additional burden” being placed on it by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals). 
 the Court held that the government could prosecute speech when it was made in circumstances 
that “create[d] a clear and present danger that . . . [would] bring about the substantive evils 
Congress ha[d] a right to prevent.”32 Although the test sounded reasonably protective, it provided 
few concrete parameters to guide judges regarding when harm resulting from speech was “clear” 
or “present.” Combined with a presumption that speakers intended to cause harm based upon the 
sheer fact of their speech,
33
 the test actually allowed punishment of speech simply because it 
criticized government actions.
34
 Furthermore, historical evidence shows that armed with such a 
malleable test, government officials primarily pursued socialist and radical groups rather than 
mainstream groups who criticized government actions. Such groups were unfamiliar and 
different, and thus were more easily cast as dangerous even though their speech was identical to 
other groups.
35
 
The Court eventually responded to the problems arising from Schenck’s amorphous 
balancing by evolving a test that required government officials to make a showing of immediate 
harm resulting from speech. In Bridges v. California, for example, the Court held “that the 
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before 
utterances can be punished.”36 Similarly, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court found that officials 
could punish incitement of unlawful action only if it was “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and [was] likely to incite or produce such action.”37 This stringent 
                                                 
32
 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
33
 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51 (noting that the circular at issue “would not have been sent unless it had been 
intended to have some effect”). 
34
 See Christina E. Wells, Lies, Honor, and the Government’s Good Name: Seditious Libel and the Stolen Valor Act, 
59 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 136, 149–50, 152 (2012). 
35
 See Christina E. Wells, Discussing the First Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1566, 1584 (2003). 
36
 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). See also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 
(1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589–90 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104–05 (1940). 
37
 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969). 
 formulation of the clear and present danger test tightened the nexus required between speech and 
harm, which was necessary to distinguish between punishing unpopular speech and punishing 
speech that caused immediate and irreparable harm.
38
  
Yet the Court has sent mixed signals about the clear and present danger test with speech 
implicating national security. Even when the Court backed away from such overt deference, it 
used a balancing test favoring the government. In Dennis v. United States, the Court upheld the 
Smith Act, a federal law punishing advocacy of overthrow of the government, as applied to the 
leaders of the Communist Party USA (“CPUSA”).39 According to the Court, although there was 
no evidence of imminent harm from defendants’ advocacy of communist doctrine, the enormity 
of the harm—potential overthrow of the government—justified weighing the magnitude of the 
harm against the likelihood of its occurrence.
40
 The alleged conspiratorial nature of the CPUSA 
coupled with the presumption that it would someday try to overthrow the United States 
authorized the government to punish the defendants’ speech although they did little more than 
teach communist literature.
41
 Post-Cold War cases attempted to limit Dennis by imposing heavy 
evidentiary and causation requirements and allowing punishment only of “incitement to 
action.”42 But the Court did not overrule Dennis as much as it reinterpreted the decision. Even 
Brandenburg did not actually overrule Dennis or Schenck. Thus, those decisions exist as 
                                                 
38
 See Wells, supra note 34, at 152–53; Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2362 (2000). 
39
 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Many scholars and jurists view Dennis as the nadir of the “clear 
and present danger” test. See Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-making, 2005 WIS. 
L. REV. 115, 119 n.16. Prior to Dennis, the Court was even more deferential toward seditious advocacy statutes, 
upholding them as long as the legislature reasonably determined that the speech was dangerous. See Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Dennis explicitly refused to apply such 
deference, but its version of the clear and present danger test was far more deferential than anything previously 
applied. 
40
 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510 (“‘In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.’” (quoting United States v. 
Dennis,183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950))). 
41
 Id. at 508–11. For further discussion of Dennis, see Wells, supra note 39, at 148–58. 
42
 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 303 (1957). 
 potential precedents. Courts can rely on them as the Rosen court did.
43
   
According to Rosen, section 793(e) legitimately punished intentional disclosures of 
“closely held” information that a person knew to be “potentially damaging to the United States 
or . . . useful to an enemy of the United States.”’44 Rosen, thus, requires only that the government 
have tried to keep the information secret (as opposed to selectively leaking it) and that the 
information be potentially harmful to the United States. The test does not require imminence or 
even substantial likelihood of harm. Instead, it requires only that a person know the information 
they disclose could “potentially” damage the U.S. or help an enemy. By removing the 
imminence requirement, Rosen allows significant government manipulation, especially given 
that most people accept the executive branch’s special expertise regarding national security 
matters.   
Furthermore, although the district judge in Rosen characterized the test as imposing a 
“bad faith purpose to either harm the United States or to aid a foreign government,”45 that 
requirement does not generally help defendants. As the Rosen judge specifically noted, the 
government need only “demonstrate the likelihood of defendant’s bad faith purpose,” which it 
can show by demonstrating that “the possessor has reason to believe [the information relating to 
the national defense] could be used to the injury of the United States.”46 In the Internet era, 
officials can essentially meet this requirement by claiming that a defendant knew enemies (i.e., 
terrorists) could access the website on which they posted the disclosed information.
47
  By 
                                                 
43
 Rosen referred to quotes in Schenck and Dennis, and the opinion cited to numerous decisions thought to be 
superseded by later decisions in order to justify the balancing approach. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 
602, 631–32, 632 n.42 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
44
 Id. at 639–40 (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1084 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)). 
45
 Id. at 626. 
46
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Rosen, 240 F.R.D. 204, 209 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2007) 
(discussing requirements to prove conspiracy for violating section 793). 
47
 See infra note 54. 
 allowing the government to base proof of bad faith on a showing that defendant had “reason to 
believe” disclosure would harm the United States, the court’s test is perilously close to the 
doctrine of constructive (or presumed) intent found in earlier decisions like Schenck and 
Dennis.
48
 
B. Balancing and the WikiLeaks Disclosures 
The very phenomena that Professor Fenster identifies regarding the WikiLeaks 
disclosures highlight why the Rosen balancing test is so dangerous.  In the immediate aftermath 
of those disclosures, government and NGO officials claimed that they would harm national 
security and diplomacy, including possibly putting individuals at risk.
49
 It is unclear if any of 
those harms have come to fruition; in some cases, officials admit that they have not.
50
 But this 
latter fact may not matter. As interpreted by Rosen, the Espionage Act seems to require only that 
one intentionally disclose “closely held” information that he knows at the time of disclosure is 
potentially damaging to the United States or useful to an enemy.
51
 It does not require that the 
material have caused actual harm.
52
 That officials immediately decried WikiLeak’s disclosures 
and sought to contain potential harm may be sufficient evidence that Assange knew the 
                                                 
48
 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
49
 Fenster, supra note 2, at 788–95. 
50
 Id. The government has apparently established task forces within various agencies to determine the extent of any 
damage although it is loathe to reveal that information. See infra note 52. 
51
 As Professor Fenster points out, some of the WikiLeaks releases may not amount to “closely held” as defined by 
Rosen although some of it undoubtedly would. For example, the information on the Iraqi war was classified as 
“secret” as were many of the diplomatic cables that were posted on WikiLeaks. It also appears that much of that 
material had not previously been disclosed. Fenster, supra note 2, at 763 & nn.42–43.   
52
 In various motions related to Bradley Manning’s court martial, which is based on charges substantially similar to 
those that Assange could face, his lawyers have argued that the government must show actual harm resulting from 
the disclosures. The military judge has ordered the government to provide damage assessments regarding the 
disclosures, but it is unclear whether they will be used at the guilt or penalty stage. Raf Sanchez, Bradley Manning 
Trial: US Government Ordered to Release WikiLeaks Damage Assessments, TELEGRAPH (London) (Apr. 24, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/9224495/Bradley-Manning-trial-US-government-ordered-to-
release-WikiLeaks-damage-assessments.html. 
 disclosures were potentially damaging to the United States.
53
 This is especially true given 
Assange’s willingness to proceed in the face of warning letters from federal officials prior to 
disclosure.
54
 Assange’s well-publicized statements that he views disclosure, at least in part, as a 
method of radical resistance (i.e., a method of destabilizing institutional authority),
55
 may also 
lend credence to the claim that he “knew” the disclosures could hurt the United States or aid its 
enemies.   
Even if actual harm is required under the Espionage Act, whether the disclosures caused 
harm will be “contentious” at the very least.56 The Rosen balancing test allows the government to 
combine that contestable harm with inferences about knowledge and intent that are likely to be 
based on manipulable feelings and prejudices about the individual disclosing the information. 
The Rosen defendants avoided prosecution because, as lobbyists with close political ties to 
powerful people, they could plausibly claim that they did not believe their actions harmed the 
United States.  Assange has no such status. The government need only portray him as a 
cyberpunk hacker with a grudge against the United States who basks in the celebrity status 
brought by continuing disclosures
57
 to create an inference that Assange intentionally disclosed 
classified information he knew could harm the country. Many people have worked hard to create 
                                                 
53
 Military prosecutors appear to use a similar theory in their charge that Bradley Manning “aid[ed] the enemy.” 
According to the prosecution, Manning’s willingness to leak the documents to WikiLeaks, when he knew they 
would be posted and accessed by members of Al Quaeda, shows the “knowledge” required for the charge. See 
WikiLeaks: Court Presses Ahead With Aiding the Enemy Charge Against Bradley Manning, TELEGRAPH (London) 
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/9230397/WikiLeaks-court-presses-ahead-
with-aiding-the-enemy-charge-against-Bradley-Manning.html. The judge characterized the requisite mental state in 
the statute as requiring “that Manning knew intelligence given to WikiLeaks would reach enemy hands.” Id. It is 
unclear what the judge will require as an evidentiary showing for this proposition. 
54
 Fenster, supra note 2, at 791–92 (discussing letter from Harold Koh at the Department of State warning Assange 
of potential problems prior to WikiLeaks’ release of the diplomatic cables). 
55
 Id. at 774–78. 
56
 Id. at 789–90. 
57
 See, e.g., John F. Burns & Ravi Somaiya, WikiLeaks Founder on the Run, Trailed by Notoriety, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/world/24assange.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.   
 just such a portrait.
58
 This is a common problem with indeterminate balancing tests as was true 
during World War I and in Dennis. Once a speaker (Assange/radicals/domestic communists) is 
portrayed as sufficiently monstrous, such tests easily allow judges or juries to overlook the 
improbability of the alleged harm (damage to national security/interference with the 
war/overthrow of the government) resulting from the speech (WikiLeaks disclosures/criticism of 
the war/advocacy of communist doctrine).
59
 
C. Balancing and Journalists 
Successful prosecution of Assange also arguably affects news organizations generally 
since they also publish “closely held” national security information.60 Observers debate whether 
WikiLeaks qualifies as actual journalism due to the Supreme Court’s decisions providing 
something akin to prosecutorial immunity for the press.
61
 However, nothing in the Pentagon 
Papers decision suggested de facto immunity; the concurring justices actually intimated that 
government officials could use the Espionage Act against such august institutions as the New 
York Times and the Washington Post. We derive any argument regarding the traditional press’s 
protection from assumptions about the way courts should interpret the Espionage Act given (1) 
the Court’s free speech jurisprudence in other areas,62 and (2) our basic understanding about the 
need for a free press. 
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 However, Rosen should cause us to rethink these assumptions. Rosen’s interpretation of 
the Espionage Act—which explicitly relied on the Pentagon Papers case and the older Supreme 
Court decisions discussed above—applies to any nongovernment publisher of classified 
information. Rosen’s interpretation was plausible given the state of the Court’s free-speech 
jurisprudence involving national security, although we may have grave doubts about whether it is 
consistent with the letter and spirit of that jurisprudence. Thus, nothing prevents a prosecutor 
from pursuing a traditional news organization or its journalists under section 793(e). 
Furthermore, as with Assange, one can easily level an allegation of conspiracy against 
investigative journalists whose bread and butter involve inducing leaks of information from 
confidential sources.
63
 Accordingly, a successful prosecution of Assange has significant negative 
implications for traditional news organizations. 
That said, traditional news organizations (especially well-established ones) are unlikely 
to see their journalists thrown in jail as a result of disclosures of confidential information.
64
 The 
balancing test that works against Assange works in favor of traditional journalists in most 
circumstances. Prosecutors are unlikely to prosecute traditional journalists as such pursuit would 
cause howls of protest.
65
 Criminal punishment of journalists contradicts our long-held notions of 
free press and informed citizenry, and arguably portrays the government as weak and 
ineffectual.
66
  Assuming the government was inclined to prosecute, courts would likely want 
very strong evidence of actual “bad purpose,” as opposed to inferring it from the defendant’s 
                                                 
63
 See Timothy Zick, Falsely Shouting Fire in a Global Theater: Emerging Complexities of Transborder Expression, 
65 VAND. L. REV. 125, 172–73 (2012). 
64
 I leave out here the government’s attempts to force disclosure of journalists’ confidential sources and focus only 
on prosecution of journalists under the Espionage Act for actually disclosing closely held information. 
65
 See Benkler, supra note 58, at 357 (discussing how we “lionize” traditional newspapers, especially local 
newspapers). 
66
 Zick, supra note 63, at 173. 
 character. Even if judges did not, it would be difficult to portray a traditional journalist as a 
radical outsider with a vendetta against the United States. In contrast, it is far easier to prosecute 
Assange, who the public holds in relatively low esteem after others have portrayed him as a 
radical and from whom traditional news sources have kept their distance.
67
 
In the end, an indeterminate balancing test like Rosen’s is likely to result in prosecution 
of journalists at the government’s whim. Thus, whether the WikiLeaks disclosures amount to 
journalism is irrelevant after Rosen.  Instead, the press should be concerned about the extent to 
which nontraditional journalists—especially online journalists unassociated with established 
news organizations—are at greater risk of prosecution simply because they are more easily 
portrayed as outsiders. History suggests that Rosen’s manipulable balancing test hurts 
nonconformists and those who can be portrayed as violating traditional social norms.
68
 Attempts 
to enforce conformity hurt not only the journalists who are prosecuted but also those who are not 
because they must make more cautious decisions in order to preserve their position as 
trustworthy stalwarts of the press. Either way, the press as an independent check on government 
suffers. 
Conclusion 
As Professor Fenster notes, balancing tests in this area of the law are both ubiquitous and 
necessary.
69
 But indeterminate balancing when speech interests are at stake is pernicious. We 
know this. The phenomena about which Professor Fenster writes appear to reinforce what history 
has already shown. He and others are right to call for a judicial test or statutory guidance in the 
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 area of national security that more carefully balances free speech and national security 
concerns.
70
 Such a test must require strong evidentiary showings, clear intent requirements, and 
other protections to ensure that balancing does not routinely work to the detriment of those who 
disclose information for nonespionage purposes. Such an approach focuses courts on actual 
harms stemming from disclosure, as opposed to the character of the people who disclose 
information, and preserves our access to important information necessary for public deliberation. 
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